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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Chicago-trial-puts-focus-on-shadowy-S-Wing-of-ISI/articleshow/8612217.cms

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/05/pakistan-inter-services-intelligence-directorate

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html?_r=0

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/02/pakistans-isi-spy-agency-s-wing-and-terrorism.html

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2934/infiltrating-pakistan-isi

Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
Agency overview
Formed1948 by General Robert Cawthome
JurisdictionGovernment of Pakistan
HeadquartersIslamabad, Pakistan
Agency executive

The Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (بین الخدماتی مخابرات) (more commonly known as just the Inter-Services Intelligence or simply by its initials ISI) is the premier intelligence service of Pakistan, operationally responsible for providing critical national security and intelligence assessment to the Government of Pakistan. The ISI is the largest of the three intelligence services of Pakistan, the others being the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Military Intelligence (MI). Previously in the 20th century, the ISI's work and activities have included the support of the Afghan mujahideen in then-communist Afghanistan against the Soviet Union in their war against the mujahideen (in conjunction with the Central Intelligence Agency) and later provided strategic and intelligence support to the Afghan Taliban against the Northern Alliance in the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1990s.[1]

The ISI is the successor of the IB and MI formed after the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 to co-ordinate and operate espionage activities for the three branches of the Pakistan Armed Forces. The ISI was established as an independent intelligence service in 1948 in order to strengthen the sharing of military intelligence between the three branches of Pakistan Armed Forces in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, which had exposed weaknesses in intelligence gathering, sharing and coordination between the Army, Air Force and Navy. From its inception, the agency has been headed by an appointed three-star general officer in the Pakistan Army, despite officers from all three branches of the Pakistan Armed Forces being served and hired by the ISI. However, after the intelligence gathering and coordination failure during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee was created with a mandate to co-ordinate and supervise all military exercises and operations of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

The Chief of Army Staff recommends the names of the Director General who reports to Prime minister, but official confirmation and appointment is needed from the Prime minister.[2] The ISI has headquarters in Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Venue, and is currently headed by Lieutenant-General Rizwan Akhter, who succeeded Zaheerul Islam in October 2014.[2][3]

History[edit]

General Ayub Khan, arriving to take command of the Pakistan Army in 1951

After independence in 1947, two new intelligence agencies were created in Pakistan: the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Military Intelligence (MI). However, the weak performance of the MI in sharing intelligence between the Army, Naval and Air Force during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 led to the creation of the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 1948.[4] The ISI was structured to be manned by officers from the three main military services, and to specialize in the collection, analysis and assessment of external intelligence, either military or non-military.[4] The ISI was the brainchild of Australian-born British Army officer, Major General Robert Cawthome, then Deputy Chief of Staff in the Pakistan Army.[4][5][6] Initially, the ISI had no role in the collection of internal intelligence, with the exception of the N.W.F.P and Azad Jammu and Kashmir.[4] The recruitment and expansion of the ISI was managed and undertaken by then-Navy's Commander Syed Mohammad Ahsan who was tenuring as Deputy Director of the Naval Intelligence. The Navy's Commander Syed Mohammad Ahsan played an integral and major role in formulating the policies of the ISI. At the end of December 1952, Major-General Robert Cawthome, Director-General of the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), sent a priority report to the Commander Ahsan, and asked for a detailed reactions of Pakistan Armed Forces personnel for the Basic principles for the ISI.

In the late 1950s, when Ayub Khan became the President of Pakistan, he expanded the rôle of ISI and MI in monitoring opposition politicians, and sustaining military rule in Pakistan.[5] The ISI was reorganised in 1966 after intelligence failures in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,[7] and expanded in 1969. Khan entrusted the ISI with the responsibility for the collection of internal political intelligence in East Pakistan. Later on, during the Baloch nationalist revolt in Balochistan in the mid-1970s, the ISI was tasked with performing a similar intelligence gathering operation.[7]

The ISI lost its importance during the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was very critical of its rôle during the 1970 general elections, which triggered off the events leading to the division of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh.[7]

After Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq seized power on 5 July 1977 and became the Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country, the ISI was expanded by making it responsible for the collection of intelligence about the Pakistan Communist Party and various political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).[7]

The Soviet war in Afghanistan of the 1980s saw the enhancement of the covert action capabilities of the ISI by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A special Afghan Section, the SS Directorate, was created under the command of Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf to oversee the coordination of the war. A number of officers from the ISI's Covert Action Division (Special Activities Division) received training in the United States and many covert action experts of the CIA were attached to the ISI to guide it in its operations against the Soviet troops by using the Afghan Mujahideen.[citation needed]

On September 2001, Parvaiz Musharraf appointed a new Director General for ISI, Lieutenant General Ehsanul Haq who was later on replaced by the Let. Gen. Shuja Pasha.[citation needed]

National Intelligence Directorate (NID) is formed in 2014 in order to pool intelligence gathered by over 30 Pakistan's intelligence agencies.[8]

Some analysts believe that the ISI provides support to militant groups, though according to other analyst, these allegations remain unsubstantiated with evidence.[9][10]

Organization[edit]

ISI's headquarters are located in Islamabad, and currently the head of the ISI is called the Director General- who has to be a serving Lieutenant General in the Pakistan Army.[citation needed] Under the Director General, three Deputy Directors General report directly to him and are in charge in three separate fields of the ISI which are Internal wing – dealing with counter-intelligence and political issues inside Pakistan, External wing – handling external issues, and Analysis and Foreign Relations wing.[11]

The general staff of the ISI mainly come from armed forces. According to some experts the ISI is the largest intelligence agency in the world in terms of number of staff. While the total number has never been made public, experts estimate about 10,000 officers and staff members, which does not include informants and assets.[5]

Accountability principles[edit]

Recently, a bill introduced by a private member in the Senate to make the agency more accountable to the Parliament and Government, was withdrawn as it reportedly did not have the concurrence of the special committee of the ruling PPP.[12]

The secretive S Wing of ISI is under fresh scrutiny in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s killing and the ongoing trial of Tahawwur Rana in Chicago where David Headley has narrated in detail ISI’s role in the Mumbai attacks.

The ISI’s involvement and planning for Mumbai attacks would have been handled by the S Wing, sources here said.

ISI coordinates all its work with terrorist groups through S Wing, a secretive, powerful and probably dispersed network that includes a number of retired military personnel. The S Wing may have “hundreds of retired military officers and terror leaders” on its rolls, said a senior official. “All that we know about ISI may not fully explain this monster,” he said of ISI and its S Wing.

The official speculated that even some very senior retired military officers who are active in the Track 2 circuit may be associated with the S Wing. “When you really look at the reach of their work, then it is clear that it is an operation with great depth and wide reach,” he said of S Wing.

Headley has outlined in the Chicago court, where he is the prosecution witness in Rana’s trial, about his extensive training and financial support from ISI. He was being handled by one Major Iqbal. Indian sources are convinced that the major is part of the S Wing.

“We have known about its (S Wing) existence for several years. It took shape probably in the 80s, and from then on it has grown in size and strength,” a former intelligence officer said, adding that the entire operation of Kashmir militancy through the past 20 years was handled by this Wing.

S Wing also handles Taliban and al-Qaida, sources said. Most Indian officers are convinced that Osama was being sheltered by select officers of S Wing.

Taliban has been S Wing’s most stunning achievement — grooming youngsters from refugee camps and madrassas to become fighters who took over Afghanistan. Colonel Imam, a legendary ISI operative who trained Mullah Omar and played a significant role in the Taliban raid into Kabul, may have been part of this S Wing, an Indian official said.

He argued that S Wing, or whatever new name it now has, is “steeped in Islamic ideologies imparted during Zia-ul-Haq’s time, and most of them are fanatics”. If ISI had to metamorphose from its present state of being a semi-criminal enterprise into a modern intelligence agency, then it would have to begin with the S Wing, said officials.


Departments[edit]

Responsible for paramilitary and covert operations as well as special activities.[13] Its roles are akin to Special Activities Division of CIA and a handful numbers of officers are trained by the CIA's SAD and active since the 1960s.[14]
  • Joint Intelligence X
coordinates all the other departments in the ISI.[5] Intelligence and information gathered from the other departments are sent to JIX which prepares and processes the information and from which prepares reports which are presented.
  • Joint Intelligence Bureau
responsible for gathering political intelligence.[5] It has three subsections, one devoted entirely to operations against India.[5]
  • Joint Counterintelligence Bureau
responsible for surveillance of Pakistan's diplomats and diplomatic agents abroad, along with intelligence operations in the Middle East, South Asia, China, Afghanistan and the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union.[5]
  • Joint Intelligence North
exclusively responsible for the Jammu and Kashmir region and Northern Areas.[5]
  • Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous
responsible for espionage, including offensive intelligence operations, in other countries.[5]
  • Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau
operates intelligence collections along the India-Pakistan border.[5] The JSIB is the ELINT, COMINT, and SIGINT directorate that is charged to divert the attacks from the foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.[5]
  • Joint Intelligence Technical
deals with development of science and technology to advance the Pakistan intelligence gathering. The directorate is charged to take steps against the electronic warfare attacks in Pakistan.[5] Without any exception, officers from this divisions are reported to be engineer officers and military scientists who deal with the military promotion of science and technology.[5] In addition, there are also separate explosives and a chemical and biological warfare sections.[5]
  • SS Directorate
which monitors the terrorist group activities that operates in Pakistan against the state of Pakistan. The SS Directorate is comparable to that of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) National Clandestine Service (NCS), and responsible for the covert political action and paramilitary special operations.
  • Political Internal Division[15]
Monitored the financial funding of the right-wing political science sphere against the left-wing political science circles. This department was involved in providing funds to the anti-left wing forces during the general elections of 1965, 1977, 1985, 1988, and 1990.[16] The department is now "inactive" since March 2012 with the new director taking the operational charge of the ISI.[17]

Headquarters[edit]

The ISI headquarters are in Islamabad. The complex consists of various adobe buildings separated by lawns and fountains. The entrance to the complex is next to a private hospital. Declan Walsh of The Guardian said that the entrance is "suitably discreet: no sign, just a plainclothes officer packing a pistol who direct visitors through a chicane of barriers, soldiers and sniffer dogs".[18] Walsh said that the complex "resembles a well-funded private university" and that the buildings are "neatly tended," the lawns are "smooth," and the fountains are "tinkling." He described the central building, which houses the director general's office on the top floor, as "a modern structure with a round, echoing lobby."[18]

Recruitment and training[edit]

Both civilians and members of the armed forces can join the ISI. For civilians, recruitment is advertised and is jointly handled by the Federal Public Services Commission (FPSC) and civilian ISI agents are considered employees of the Ministry of Defence. The FPSC conducts various examinations testing the candidate's knowledge of current affairs, English and various analytical abilities. Based on the results, the FPSC shortlists the candidates and sends the list to the ISI who conduct the initial background checks. The selected candidates are then invited for an interview which is conducted by a joint committee comprising both ISI and FPSC officials.[4]

Al Qaeda and Taliban militants captured[edit]

Ramzi Yousef, one of the planners of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as well as the Bojinka plot. Pakistani intelligence, and the Department of State – U.S. Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) Special Agents, captured Yousef in Islamabad, Pakistan. On February 7, 1995, they raided room #16 in the Su-Casa Guest House in Islamabad, Pakistan, and captured Yousef before he could move to Peshawar.[19]
In November 2001, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, a Libyan paramilitary trainer for Al-Qaeda attempted to flee Afghanistan following the collapse of the Taliban precipitating the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan but was captured by Pakistani Forces.[20]
Sheikh Omar Saeed, a British-born terrorist of Pakistani descent was arrested by Pakistani police on February 12, 2002, in Lahore, in conjunction with the Pearl kidnapping. Pearl had been kidnapped, had his throat slit, and then been beheaded and Sheikh Omar Saeed was named the chief suspect.[21] Sheikh told the Pakistani court, however, that he had surrendered to the ISI a week earlier.[22]
Abu Zubaydah, an Al-Qaeda terrorist responsible for hatching multiple terrorist plots including sending Ahmed Ressam to blow up the Los Angeles airport in 2000.[23] He was captured on March 28, 2002, by ISI, CIA and FBI agents after they had raided several safe houses in Faisalabad, Pakistan.[24][25][26][27]
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an Al-Qaeda terrorist responsible for planning the 9/11 terrorist attacks as well as the attack on 2000 USS Cole bombing, and the 2002 Ghriba synagogue bombing in Tunisia.[28] On September 11, 2002, the ISI successfully captured Ramzi bin al-Shibh during a raid in Karachi.[29]
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks as well as other significant terrorist plots over the last twenty years, including the World Trade Center 1993 bombings, the Operation Bojinka plot, an aborted 2002 attack on the U.S. Bank Tower in Los Angeles, the Bali nightclub bombings, the failed bombing of American Airlines Flight 63, the Millennium Plot, and the murder of Daniel Pearl. On March 1, 2003, the ISI successfully captured KSM in a joint raid with the CIA's Special Activities Division paramilitary operatives and the Diplomatic Security Service Special Agents in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.[30]
  • Abu Faraj Farj al-Liby
Pakistani intelligence agencies and security forces arrested Abu Faraj Farj al-Liby, mastermind of two failed attempts on President Pervez Musharraf's life, in May 2005.[31]
  • Maulvi Omar
Senior aid to Baitullah Mehsud captured by ISI in August 2009.
Taliban's deputy commander, Abdul Ghani Baradar was captured by U.S. and Pakistani forces in Pakistan on February 8, 2010, in a morning raid.[32]

Reception[edit]

Critics of the ISI say that it has become a state within a state and not accountable enough. Some analysts say that this is because of the fact that intelligence work agencies around the world remain secretive. Critics argue the institution should be more accountable to the President or the Prime Minister.[33] After discovering it, the Pakistani Government disbanded the ISI 'Political Wing' in 2008.[34]

U.S. government[edit]

During the Cold War the ISI and CIA worked together to send spy planes into the Soviet Union.[35] The ISI and CIA also worked closely during the Soviet-Afghan War supporting groups such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i Islami and Jalaluddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network.[36]

Some report the ISI and CIA stepped up cooperation in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks to kill and capture senior Al Qaeda leaders such as Sheikh Younis Al Mauritan and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (the planner of the 9/11 attacks who was residing in Pakistan). Pakistan claims that in total around 100 top level al-Qaeda leaders/operators were killed/arrested by ISI.[37] Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Pakistan was paying a "big price for supporting the U.S. war against terror groups. ... I think it is important to note that as they have made these adjustments in their own assessment of their national interests, they're paying a big price for it".[38]

Other senior international officials, however, maintain that senior Al Qaeda leaders such as Osama Bin Laden have been hidden by the ISI in major settled areas of Pakistan with the full knowledge of the Pakistani military leadership.[39] A December 2011 analysis report by the Jamestown Foundation came to the conclusion that "in spite of denials by the Pakistani military, evidence is emerging that elements within the Pakistani military harbored Osama bin Laden with the knowledge of former army chief General Pervez Musharraf and possibly current Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. Former Pakistani General Ziauddin Butt (a.k.a. General Ziauddin Khawaja) revealed at a conference on Pakistani–U.S. relations in October 2011 that according to his knowledge the then former Director-General of Intelligence Bureau of Pakistan (2004–2008), Brigadier Ijaz Shah (retd.), had kept Osama bin Laden in an Intelligence Bureau safe house in Abbottabad."[40] Pakistani General Ziauddin Butt said Bin Laden had been hidden in Abbottabad by the ISI "with the full knowledge" of Pervez Musharraf[40] but later denied making any such statement, saying his words were altered by the media, he said: "It is the hobby of the Western media to distort the facts for their own purposes."[41] U.S. military officials have increasingly said, they do not notify Pakistani officials before conducting operations against the Afghan Taliban or Al Qaeda, because they fear Pakistani officials may tip them off.[42]

International officials have accused the ISI of continuing to support and even lead the Taliban today in the War in Afghanistan (2001-present). As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen stated:

The fact remains that the Quetta Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity ... Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. ... For example, we believe the Haqqani Network—which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government ... is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.

— [43]

The Associated Press reported that "the president said Mullen's statement 'expressed frustration' over the insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. But Obama said 'the intelligence is not as clear as we might like in terms of what exactly that relationship is.' Obama added that whether Pakistan's ties with the Haqqani network are active or passive, Pakistan has to deal with it."[44][45]

The Guantanamo Bay files leak, however, showed that the US authorities unofficially consider the ISI as a terrorist organization equally dangerous as Al Qaeda and Taliban, and many allegations of its supporting terrorist activities have been made.[46][47]

Indian government[edit]

India has accused ISI of plotting the Mumbai terror attack in March 1993[48] and November 2008. According to the United States diplomatic cables leak the ISI had previously shared intelligence information regarding possible terrorist attacks against in India in late 2008.[49] ISI is also accused of supporting pro independence militias in Jammu and Kashmir[50] while Pakistan denies all such claims.[51][52][53]

India accuses ISI of supporting separatist militants in Jammu and Kashmir while Pakistan claims to give them moral support only.[54]

Allegations of support for terrorism[edit]

The ISI has long been accused of using designated terrorist groups and militants to conduct proxy wars against its neighbors.[55][56][57] According to Grant Holt and David H. Gray "The agency specializes in utilizing terrorist organizations as proxies for Pakistani foreign policy, covert action abroad, and controlling domestic politics."[58] James Forest says there has been increasing proof from counter-terrorism organizations that militants and the Taliban continue to receive assistance from the ISI, as well as the establishment of camps to train terrorists on Pakistani territory.[59] All external operations are carried out under the supervision of the S Wing of the ISI.[60] The agency is divided into Eight divisions.[61] Joint Intelligence/North(JIN) is responsible for conducting operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan.[62] The Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau(JSIB) provide support with communications to groups in Kashmir.[62] According to Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, both former members of the National Security Council, the ISI acted as a "kind of terrorist conveyor belt" radicalizing young men in the Madrassas in Pakistan and delivering them to training camps affiliated with or run by Al-Qaeda and from there moving them into Jammu and Kashmir to launch attacks.[63]

Equipment[edit]

Losses[edit]

Since Pakistan's launch of war on Al-Qaeda, Taliban and other jihadist groups, the country's armed forces, intelligence services (particularly ISI), military industrial complexes, paramilitary forces and police forces have come under intense attacks. ISI has played major role in targeting these groups, therefore it has faced retaliatory strikes as well. As of 2011, more than 300 ISI officials have been killed.[64] Below are some major incidents when attempts were made to target ISI.

  • A suicide bomber struck his vehicle into bus carrying officials killing at least 28 people on November 28, 2007 outside ISI office in Rawalpindi.[65]
  • 30 people including four officials of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and 14 policemen were killed and over 300 were injured when three people attacked ISI office on May 27, 2009 in Lahore. The attackers fired at ISI office and policemen present there. The guards at ISI building fought back. During the incident of firing explosive laden vehicle detonated[66][67]
  • At least 13 people among 10 military personnel were killed when suicide bomber blew up his van into agency’s Peshawar office on November 13, 2009. Around 400 kg of explosives were used which destroyed significant portion of building.[68]
  • Two attackers ambushed Multan office in which 8 people were killed and 45 were injured on December 8, 2009. Two army personnel were dead and seven while seven officials were injured. About 800–1000 kg of explosives were used.[69]
  • A car bomb exploded at CNG station in Faisalabad on March 8, 2011 killing 25 people and injuring more than 100. Taliban spokesman Mr. Ehsanullah Ehsan told that nearby located ISI office was the target. No losses of ISI personnel were reported except only 1 official was injured.[70]
  • Three intelligence officials were killed and one was wounded when vehicle carrying agency's personnel was ambushed in FR Bannu on 14 September 2011.[71]
  • Four people including ISI officials were killed and 35 were injured when local office of ISI was attacked by 5 suicide bombers in Sukkur on July 24, 2013.[72]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Matt Waldman (June 2010). "The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan's ISI and Afghan Insurgents" (PDF). Crisis States Working Papers (series no.2, no. 18). Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science: 3. In the 1980s the ISI was instrumental in supporting seven Sunni Muslim mujahedeen groups in their jihad against the Soviets, and was the principal conduit of covert US and Saudi funding. It subsequently played a pivotal rôle in the emergence of the Taliban (Coll 2005:292) and Pakistan provided significant political, financial, military and logistical support to the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996–2001)(Rashid 2001).
  2. ^ a b "No extension to Pasha, Lt Gen. Rizwan Akhtar appointed new DG ISI". Geo News. Friday, March 9, 2012 (updated 8 hours ago). Retrieved 9 March 2012. {{cite news}}: |first= missing |last= (help); Check date values in: |date= (help)
  3. ^ "Gilani appoints new ISI chief".
  4. ^ a b c d e "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2008-05-12.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Pike, John (2002-07-25). "Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence". Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved 2008-12-13.
  6. ^ Anwar Hussain Syed; Research Society of Pakistan (2007). Issues and realities of Pakistani politics. Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab. ISBN 978-969-425-099-1. Retrieved 8 April 2013.
  7. ^ a b c d rakshak, Bharat. "ISI". Retrieved 2008-05-12.
  8. ^ Intelligence: Pakistan Tries A DNI
  9. ^ "Steve Coll: "Zawahiri's record suggests he will struggle" | FRONTLINE". PBS. 2 May 2011. Retrieved 2011-12-17.
  10. ^ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Burke, Arleigh A.; Vira, Varun (25 July 2011). Burke Chair in Strategy. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies: 183–184. {{cite journal}}: |contribution= ignored (help); Cite journal requires |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
  11. ^ Shuja Nawaz. "Focusing the Spy Glass on Pakistan's ISI" The Huffington Post, 2 October 2008
  12. ^ "Proposed bill making ISI accountable withdrawn from the Senate". 14 July 2012.
  13. ^ Pakistan Intelligence, Security Activities & Operations Handbook. USA International Business Publications, Usa Ibp. 2006. ISBN 0739711946. {{cite book}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |last= (help)
  14. ^ Raman, B. (2002). Intelligence : past, present & future. New Delhi: Lancer Publishers & Distributors. ISBN 8170622220.
  15. ^ "Pakistan Intelligences Services". Pakistan Intelligence, Security Activities & Operations Handbook (google books). International Business Publications. ISBN 0739711946. {{cite book}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |last= (help)CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  16. ^ ISI funded political parties. Tribune.com.pk. Retrieved on 2012-08-24.
  17. ^ Political wing in ISI. Awamipolitics.com (2012-04-01). Retrieved on 2012-08-24.
  18. ^ a b Walsh, Declan. "Whose side is Pakistan's ISI really on?." The Guardian.. Thursday 12 May 2011.
  19. ^ Benjamin, Daniel & Steven Simon. "The Age of Sacred Terror", 2002
  20. ^ Risen, James. "State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration", 2006
  21. ^ CNN Transcript "Suspected Mastermind of Pearl Killing Arrested". CNN. February 7, 2001. Retrieved 2006-06-29. February 12, 2002.
  22. ^ Wright, Abi. Committee to Protect Journalists, May 2006. "Heading into Danger". Retrieved 2006-06-29.
  23. ^ "Transcript: Bin Laden determined to Strike in US CNN.com, Saturday April 10, 2004". Edition.cnn.com. 2004-04-10. Retrieved 2011-04-09.
  24. ^ Andy Worthington The Guantanamo Files Pluto Press, 2007
  25. ^ TIM McGIRK Faisalabad Monday, Apr. 08, 2002 (2002-04-08). "Tim McGirk, Anatomy of a Raid TIME Magazine, April 8, 2002". Time.com. Retrieved 2011-04-09.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  26. ^ Burns, John F. (2002-04-14). "John Burns, A NATION CHALLENGED: THE FUGITIVES, In Pakistan's Interior, A Troubling Victory in Hunt for Al Qaeda New York Times, April 14, 2002". New York City; Pakistan; Faisalabad (Pakistan); Washington (Dc): New York Times. Retrieved 2011-04-09.
  27. ^ Washington, The (2002-04-03). "Anti-terror raids yield bonanza for U.S. intelligence Seattle Times, April 2, 2002". Community.seattletimes.nwsource.com. Retrieved 2011-04-09.
  28. ^ "Ramzi bin al-Shibh: al-Qaeda suspect". BBC. September 14, 2002.
  29. ^ Shahzad, Syed Saleem (October 30, 2002). "A chilling inheritance of terror". Asia Times.
  30. ^ Shane, Scott (June 22, 2008). "Inside a 9/11 Mastermind's Interrogation". New York Times.
  31. ^ "FACTBOX: Major al Qaeda militants killed or captured". Reuters. September 15, 2009.
  32. ^ "Taliban commander Mullah Baradar 'seized in Pakistan'". BBC News. February 16, 2010. Retrieved 2010-02-16.
  33. ^ Chazan, David (2002-01-09). "Profile: Pakistan's military intelligence agency". BBC News. Retrieved 2006-05-05.
  34. ^ "ISI closes its political wing". Retrieved 2008-05-05.
  35. ^ CRASH OF US U-2 SPY PLANE. Southasiaanalysis.org. Retrieved on 2012-08-24.
  36. ^ Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region (2002 1st ed.). Palgrave, New York.
  37. ^ Pakistan's anti-terror success. Thenews.com.pk. Retrieved on 2012-08-24.
  38. ^ [1][dead link]
  39. ^ Boone, Jon (2011-05-05). "Osama Bin Laden death: Afghanistan 'had Abbottabad lead four years ago'". London: The Guardian.
  40. ^ a b "Former Pakistan Army Chief Reveals Intelligence Bureau Harbored Bin Laden in Abbottabad". Jamestown Foundation. 2011-12-22.
  41. ^ Ashraf Javed (16 February 2012). "Ijaz Shah to sue Ziauddin Butt". The Nation. Retrieved 14 November 2012.
  42. ^ "Kissinger: 'Almost Impossible' That Pakistan Didn't Know Bin Laden Was Hiding in the Region". Foxnews. 2011-03-05.
  43. ^ Joscelyn, Thomas (2011-09-22). "Admiral Mullen: Pakistani ISI sponsoring Haqqani attacks". The Long War Journal. Retrieved 2011-12-01. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing today, Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highlighted the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Agency's role in sponsoring the Haqqani Network – including attacks on American forces in Afghanistan. "The fact remains that the Quetta Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity," Mullen said in his written testimony. "Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers." Mullen continued: "For example, we believe the Haqqani Network—which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency—is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul."
  44. ^ Obama won't back Mullen's claim on Pakistan. NDTV.com (2011-10-01). Retrieved on 2012-08-24.
  45. ^ "Most Popular E-mail Newsletter". USA Today. 2011-09-22.
  46. ^ "Rediff News: For the US, ISI is a terrorist organisation". 26 April 2011. Retrieved 2 February 2012.
  47. ^ Burke, Jason (25 April 2011). "Guantánamo Bay files: Pakistan's ISI spy service listed as terrorist group". The Guardian. London.
  48. ^ Black Friday: the true story of the Bombay bomb blasts, S. Hussain Zaidi, Penguin Books, 2002, p. 30
  49. ^ WikiLeaks: Pakistan shared intelligence with Israel post 26/11. daily.bhaskar.com (2010-12-02). Retrieved on 2012-08-24.
  50. ^ Burke, Jason (2010-10-18). "Pakistan intelligence services 'aided Mumbai terror attacks'". The Guardian. London.
  51. ^ "Diplomat denies Pakistan role in Mumbai attacks". The Independent. London. 2009-01-31.
  52. ^ Khan, Zarar (2008-12-01). "Pakistan Denies Government Involvement In Mumbai Attacks". Huffington Post.
  53. ^ King, Laura (2009-01-07). "Pakistan denies official involvement in Mumbai attacks". Los Angeles Times.
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Further reading[edit]

  • Ayub, Muhammad (2005). An Army, Its Role and Rule: A History of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil from 1947–1999. Pittsburgh: RoseDog Books. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.
  • Jan, Abid Ullah (2006). From BCCI to ISI: The Saga of Entrapment Continues. Ottawa: Pragmatic Publishing. ISBN 0-9733687-6-4.
  • Yousaf, Mohammad; Adkin, Mark (2001). Afghanistan the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower. Barnsley: Leo Cooper. ISBN 0-85052-860-7.
  • Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press. ISBN 1-59420-007-6.
  • Henderson, Robert D'A (2003). Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook. Dulles, VA: Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-550-2.
  • Schneider, Jerrold E.; Chari, P. R.; Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal; Cohen, Stephen Phillip (2003). Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia: The Compound Crisis in 1990. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-30797-X.
  • Crile, George (2003). Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History. New York: Grove Press. ISBN 0-8021-4124-2.
  • Todd, Paul; Bloch, Jonathan (2003). Global Intelligence : The World's Secret Services Today. Dhaka: University Press. ISBN 1-84277-113-2.
  • Bamford, James (2004). A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies. New York: Doubleday. ISBN 0-385-50672-4.

External links[edit]

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